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straight forward, and positive, which gives authority, and fixed re-
sponsibility. Many states are now proposing the Unicameral or single
house legislature as a remedy for these evils.
-0
TAX-FREE INVESTMENTS IN KENTUCKY.
Real estate located in another state has no situs in Kentucky, and
legislation by this state could not give it a situs here even though
the owner is domiciled in Kentucky. (i) The same thing is true of
tangible personalty. (2) As to tangible personal property, the
ordinary rule is that the situs is at the domicile of the owner. Withi
certain limits this rule may be changed by legislation, and a statut-
fixing the situs of intangible personalty at the domicile of a non-
resident has the effect of exempting such property from taxation so
far as Kentucky is concerned. An example is the statute fixing the
situs of intangible trust property at the domicile of the cestui instead
of the domicile of the trustee even though the trustee is domiciled in
Kentucky and cestui is not. (3)
But all property having a situs in this state, except United States
bonds (4) and property expressly exempted in Section 170 of our
constitution, must be subjected to the general property tax. An act
of the Legislature expressly exempting any other property from taxa-
tion would be unconstitutional.
How, then, can one write of tax-free investments in Kentucky?
The answer is to be found in the following principle: There may be
many different property rights, legally speaking, where there is but
one property, economically speaking. The courts when permitted or
authorized to do so by the Legislature, can look behind the legal
technicalities, see the substantial oneness of the property, and require
the holder of only one of the legal rights to pay the tax on the prop-
erty, exempting the holders of the other legal rights in the same
property. But the courts may, when not permitted or authorized to do
otherwise by the Legislature, require the holders of two or more
legal rights to pay taxes upon the full value of the property, although
there is, economically speaking, but one property.
For an illustration, suppose that X owns $iooooo in gold coin,
and that Y owns a factory worth $ioo,ooo. The State would collect
taxes upon $2ooooo worth of property. Suppose then that X and his
friends A, B, C, and D organize the Alphabet Bank with a capital stock
of $ioo.ooo. X puts up his $iooooo of gold coin for the capital stock.
He has certificates for five shares each issued to A, B, C, and D, be-
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cause there must be at least five incorporators, but these dummies hold
their stock in trust for X. X then borrows the $ioo,ooo back from the
Bank, giving his note. (I know the law against excess loans, but,
like some bank officers, am ignoring it.) With this $iooooo, X next
buys the factory from Y, and Y deposits the money in the Alphabet
Bank. X and his friends E and F then organize the X Manufacturing
Company with a capital stock of $5o,ooo; and X conveys to it the
factory at a valuation of $ioo,ooo, taking a note for $5o,ooo and all of
the stock in the Manufacturing Company, but having five shares of
the stock issued to E and five shares to F, who hold their stock in
trust for X.
Obviously no new wealth has been created. Economically speak-
ing, there is still the same property; but, legally speaking, many new
property rights have been created. The Bank owns X's notes for
$ioo,ooo and the $ioo,ooo worth of gold coin. The Manufacturing
Company owns the factory worth $Ioo,ooo. Y owns a chose in action
against the Bank for $ioo,ooo by reason of his deposit. A, B, C, and
D each own $500 worth of stock in the Manufacturing Company. X
owns the Manufacturing Company's note for $5o,ooo, is the legal
owner of $98,ooo worth of stock in the Bank and of 49,ooo worth of
stock in the Manufacturing Company, and has a cestui's equitable
rights against A, B, C, D, E, and Fas to their $3,000 worth of stock
which they hold as trustees for him.
Looking at the situation as lawyers, we see property which totals
$6o3,00o. As business men looking through the forms at the sub-
stance, we see that there is only $2oo,ooo worth of property. If I
have done my sums correctly, the State would collect taxes on $25o,00o
worth of property. The other $353,000 of property which the lawyers
see, is "tax-free" in the sense in which that phrase is used in this essay.
We will consider first, what investments are tax-free under our
present statutes, and second, what other investments could be made
tax-free by statute under our present constitution.
Although a trustee and his cestui both have property rights, the
law requires the tax to be paid by only one of them. (5) At least
that is true where the cestui's rights are ascertained.
If we adopt the entity theory of partnership (and for purposes
of taxation a firm is a distinct entry (6), the partnership owns
property and each partner owns an interest in the partnership; but
no one has ever contended that after the firm has paid taxes on part-
nership property, the individual partner ought also to pay taxes on
his interest in the partnership. (7)
When we turn from partner and partnership to stockholder and
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corporation, we find the law more complicated. Technically, the
stockholder owns shares of stock in the corporation, the corporation
owns the property in which its capital stock is invested. Both are
legally property. The law may stop there and tax both without violat-
ing constitutional provisions for equality and uniformity of taxation
or even without violating a constitutional prohibition or double taxa-
tion. (8) Or the law may look behind the technicalities, see the
substantial oneness of the property and require the tax to be paid on
only one valuation without violating a constitutional provision that all
property must be taxed. The revenue agents in Kentucky have fought
valiantly in an effort to tax shares of stock in the hands of the stock-
holder. When beaten as to one class of corporations, they have re-
newed their efforts as to other classes. They have sought to draw
really pretty distinctions in this respect between franchise and non-
franchise corporations, foreign and domestic corporations, corpora-
tions most of whose property is situated in this state and corpora-
tions most of whose property is situated outside the state. In a series
of most interesting cases, the Kentucky law has become established
that when a corporation pays taxes on its property situated in Ken-
tucky, its stockholders need not pay taxes on their shares of stock.
The final case (9) in that series holds this to be true even of a foreign,
non-franchise corporation, most of whose property is situated out-
side of Kentucky. The opinion in that case is a very able one and
its citation of authorities furnishes a key to the successive steps by
which the rule has been applied to shares in the several different
classes of corporations.
The legislative sanction for the rule as to franchise corporations
is to be found in Kentucky Statutes, section 4088:
"The individual stockholder of the corporations which are,
by this article required to report and pay taxes upon the corporate
franchise, shall not be required to list their shares in such com-
panies so long as the corporations pay the taxes upon the cor-
porate property and franchises as herein provided."
The legislative sanction for the rule as to non-franchise corpora-
tions is to be found in Kentucky Statutes, section 4085:
"The property of all corporations, except where herein dif-
ferently provided, shall be assessed in the name of the corpora-
tion in the same manner as that of a natural person * * * *-
and so long as said corporation pays the taxes on all its property
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of every kind, the individual stockholders shall not be required
to list their shares in said corporation."
Some corporate stock in Kentucky is, however, taxed. For in-
stance, stock belonging to a Kentuckian in a foreign corporation all of
whose property is situated outside the state and which therefore pays
no taxes to Kentucky, must be listed for assessment in the name of
the stockholder. (io) The individual stockholders in Building and
Loan Associations are required to list and pay taxes on their shares
(valued at the amount paid in), but the corporation is not required
to pay taxes on the notes, etc., in which it invests the capital stock
paid in. (ii) The method of taxing banks and trust companies and
shares of stock in such corporations is dictated by the restrictions on
state taxation of national banks. The corporation pays taxes on its
real estate as owner. It also pays, "for and on behalf of" the stock-
holders, taxes upon all the shares of its stock less the assessed value
of its real estate. The individual shareholders are not required to
list their shares for taxtion. By an act of 1912 (12), the same method
of taxation was applied to domestic life insurance companies as was
already in force as to banks and trust companies.
The fact that, with the four exceptions just mentioned, shares of
stock need not be listed for taxation in Kentucky, has frequently in-
duced the organizers of corporations to create preferred stock instead
of bonds when they expected to find a market for their securities
among Kentucky investors. By fixing the rate of dividends on pre-
ferred stock, making the dividends cumulative, giving to the preferred
stock a priority in the event of dissolution, and placing at a low figure
the amount of indebtedness that can be incurred, the preferred stock
can be made almost identical with bonds as to security. The resem-
blance to bonds in everything except liability to taxation is made
closer by giving the voting power to the common stock only, and by
giving the corporation the right to retire the preferred stock at par
after the lapse of a stated time. Although most bonds escape taxation
illegally simply because their ownership is concealed, the legal freedom
from taxation of preferred stock is attractive to investors and this
device will doubtless be more and more frequently used as it becomes
better understood.
The last paragraph serves both as a conclusion to our considera-
tion of stock and as an introduction to our consideration of bonds,
notes, and other indebtedness. Just as it is true that there is only one
property, economically speaking, but there are two properties, legally
speaking, in the case of trustee and cestui, of firm and partner, or of
corporation and stockholder, so is it true that while the business man
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sees only one property, the lawyer sees one property right in the
creditor to his debt and another property right in the debtor to the
thing for which the debt was incurred or in which borrowed money is
invested. To tax both involves the same sort of duoble taxation that
would be involved if the state taxed separately the trustee on his legal
title and the cestui on his equitable title, the firm on its property and
the partner on his interest in the stockholder on his shares of stock.
What conceivable difference does it make, either as to the ability of the
owner to pay taxes or as to the burden on the state of protecting the
property, that X in our supposititious case took from his Manufactur-
ing Company in exchange for the factory $5o,ooo in stock and a note
for $5o,ooo instead of taking $iooooo in stock? The value of a debt
depends upon the property of the debtor which can be subjected to its
payment, just as the value of corporate stock depends upon the prop-
erty which the corporation owns.
The double taxation involved in assessing encumbered property
at its full value and of also assessing the debt in the hands of the
creditor, was discussed in the convention which framed our present
constitution. The following amendment was proposed to the section
on exemptions:
"A purchase money lien or mortgage on real property to
secure a debt created in good faith, shall, for the purpose of taxa-
tion, be regarded an interest in the property upon which the lien
exists, and the amount of such encumbrance shall be deducted
from the valuation of the property in the assessment thereof, pro-
vided the debt, to secure which the lien is created, be assessed
and taxed for the purposes for which the real property is liable."
The Chairman of the Committee on Revenue and Taxation said
concerning this proposed amendment:
"I do not understand it to be an exemption. It is a provision
to guard against what is sometimes called double taxation. I do
not think it belongs here."
The amendment was rejected. (13) Later the same provision
was offered as a separate section and it was again rejected. (4)
Another delegate offered the following section:
"Whenever there is a lien on land for the purchase money,
the tax shall be levied on the land, and the owner of said land
shall pay the tax; but shall have a credit on the lien indebtedness
for the amount of the tax on said land, in the proportion that the
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debt bears to the whole value of the land; but the lien debt shall
not be taxed in the hands of the lien-holder."
This also was rejected. (15)
The Convention adopted the following section:
"All mortgages and other liens upon real estate shall be deem-
ed, pro tanto, a taxable interest in said property, and it shall be
the duty of the General Assembly to make provision for an
equitable adjustment of such taxes between the owner of the
fees and the one holding an equitable interest therein." (16)
Another section was adopted extending those provisions to per-
sonal estate. (17) But on reconsideration, both of these sections
were afterwards rejected. (18) The reported debates show that the
reason for this action was a fear that railroads and other corporations
could have their mortgage bond issues deducted in assessing their
property, although the bond-holders lived out of the state and hence
could not be reached.
The general rule now is that, in assessing property, no deduction
can be made on account of the owner's debts. (19) To this rule,
however, there are four exceptions. A bank is not required to pay
taxes upon the notes, etc., in which its deposits are invested, the
depositors being required to list the deposits in their own names.
The Court, in one case (20), bases this exception upon the theory that
a bank is a quasi-trustee for its depositors, but in a later case (21)
bases it upon the legislative intent. By the act of 1912, referred to
above, the reserves of a domestic life insurance company, held to
secure its outstanding policies, are treated like bank deposits. A
Building and Loan Association is not required to pay taxes on the
notes in which it invests borrowed money. (22) A borrower from a
Building and Loan Association is not required to pay taxes on his
shares of stock which are pledged to the corporation to secure a loan.
The legislative sanction for the last two exceptions is found in Ken-
tucky Statutes, sections 4093-4o94.
There is no instance under the Kentucky law in which a debt is
tax-free in the hands of the creditor for the reason that the property
for which it,was incurred, by which it is secured, or in which bor-
rowed money is invested, is taxed in the name of the debtor.
Reverting now to the case supposed as an illustration, we find
that Y is taxed upon his bank deposit value at $iooooo. Although
the Bank owns $ioo,ooo in gold coin and X's note for $iooooo, it pays
no taxes as owner. It pays taxes for and on behalf of its stockholders
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on their shares of stock valued at $ioo,ooo. The Manufacturing Com-
pany pays taxes on its factory valued at $ioo,ooo. X pays taxes on
the Manufacturing Company's note valued at $50,000. He pays no
taxes on his bank stock because the bank has paid the taxes on that.
He pays no taxes on his Manufacturing Company stock bceause the
corporation has paid taxes on its property. A, B, C, D, E, and F pay
no taxes on the stock which they own as trustees for the same reasons
and for the additional reason that, even if it were taxable in the hands
of its owner, the cestui and not the trustees would pay the tax.
So much for tax-free investments under our present statutes.
Can the Legislature go farther in this direction without a constitu-
tional amendment? What shall we say of a statute providing that
the owners of notes, bonds, or debts otherwise evidenced, shall not be
required to list same for taxation so long as the debtor pays the taxes
upon the property encumbered to secure the payment thereof, or for
which the debt was incurred, or in which the money for which the
note or bond was given is invested? This is not the proper place to
discuss the justice of such a statute or its advantages, its tendency to
lower the interest rate, to attract capital to the state, or to encourage
small private investors to lend on mortgages instead of making un-
secured personal loans which can be concealed. Would it be constitu-
tional? The Kentucky bar are generally of the opinion that it would
not. But the fact that the Constitutional Convention rejected pro-
visions forbidding the double taxation of debtor and creditor, does not
necessarily mean that the Constitution requires such double taxation.
It may be optional with the Legislature. If I have correctly deduced
the general principle from the illustrations presented and the cases
cited above and if that general principal is applicable to this case, then
the courts, in this instance as in the others, when permitted or author-
ized to do so by the Legislature, can look behind the legal technicalities
and see and recognize the substantial oneness of the property without
violating the rule that no property having a situs here can be exempted
from taxation except that mentioned in Section i7o; and it follows that
the statute suggested would be constitutional.
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Stratton v. Northeast Coal Company.
Decided April 23, 1915. Appeal from' Floyd Circuit Court.
Master and Servant. The mere fact that a servant receives an
injury while engaged in the service of the master, does not make the
master responsible for the damages. It is a well settled principle,
